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How is disaster aid allocated within poor villages? 
Abstract 
How disaster aid is allocated within poor villages is little understood. This paper 
examines risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies as village self-allocation 
mechanisms. Original survey data from Fiji contain rich information about cyclone 
damage, traditional kin status, and aid allocations over post-disaster phases, at both 
household and kin-group levels. The paper shows under what conditions the performance 
of targeting aid to victims can significantly differ from overall risk-sharing outcomes 
determined by private transfers and aid (i.e., targeting gap). Elite domination can occur 
not only in aid allocation independent of damage, but also in targeting on damage (i.e., 
targeting bias).   





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Vulnerability to natural disasters is a major barrier to development and poverty 
alleviation (Skoufias, 2003), and effectively allocating disaster aid is critically important. 
In rural areas, aid agents distribute private goods (e.g., food, water) and public goods 
(e.g., shelter, infrastructure) across villages. How aid in the form of private goods 
distributed to a village is allocated within the village is a critical question that has not 
been sufficiently answered because of a paucity of data. Morris and Wodon (2003), for 
example, examine across-household allocation of disaster aid, but their data, which 
contain only five households per village, cannot address the issue of within-village 
allocation. As aid agents’ capacity and resources are limited in developing areas, village 
mechanisms play major roles in aid allocation. Using original, post-cyclone data in rural 
Fiji, this paper examines risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies as self-allocation 
mechanisms.
1
Informal risk-sharing institutions are critically important in poor populations (see, 
for example, Dercon, 2002; Morduch, 1999 for reviews). Although a natural disaster is a 
region-wide covariate shock, it may contain significant idiosyncratic components that can 
be locally shared, as shown by recent empirical studies (e.g., Mozumder et al., 2009; 
Sawada and Shimizutani, 2008; Takasaki, 2011a). I assume that although disaster aid is 
distributed through public transfers to the village, its allocation within the village follows 
private risk-sharing arrangements (Dercon and Krishnan, 2005, for example, show that 
food aid is allocated as part of informal risk sharing in Ethiopian villages). How well 
local ex post risk sharing can work depends on how much pooled resources that can be 




shared among people are reduced by the covariate disaster shock and then augmented by 
disaster aid.  
Targeting disaster aid toward victims – the greater the damage, the higher the 
probability of receipt or the greater the amount received – is a common goal. Frequent 
reports point to an inefficient distribution of disaster relief by uncoordinated agents who 
lack pertinent information about the damage (Amin and Goldstein, 2008). Importantly, 
when aid is allocated through risk sharing in a village, targeting performance no longer 
measures the effectiveness of disaster management. This is because what determines 
victims’ welfare is their overall risk-sharing outcome, i.e., how much net aggregate 
private transfer, including aid, they receive. Researchers have not yet explored a potential 
difference between targeting performance and overall risk sharing, which I call a 
targeting gap. Distinct from targeting errors (e.g., inclusion/exclusion errors) determining 
targeting performance, the targeting gap determines the usefulness of the targeting itself. 
The paper shows under what conditions a targeting gap can be significant. 
Independent of risk sharing, a social hierarchy can strongly shape the village 
governance that determines aid allocation. The paper shows how bargaining between 
elites and non-elites can lead to elite domination: Elites are more likely to be recipients or 
to receive a greater amount than non-elites. In kin-based Fijian society, hereditary elite 
status is of central importance (Turner, 1992); such hierarchical lineage-based societies 
are also common in Sub-Saharan Africa (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). Since my survey 
stratified households in each village by their kin group and elite status, direct measures of 
elite status at the household and kin-group levels are available; in standard household 




observable, there are too few elites/elite groups to make a statistical analysis possible. As 
such, I can directly capture elite dominance.  
Building on kinship, risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies are not 
independent of each other. In particular, kin groups are a major village subgroup in both 
risk sharing and bargaining. The paper shows that the interaction of these two 
mechanisms can lead to elite domination in targeting on damage, which I call targeting 
bias. Targeting bias is a potential source of systematic targeting errors.   
The analysis compares emergency food aid in the relief and early recovery phases 
(6 months after the cyclone) and the provision of housing construction materials mostly 
in the recovery/reconstruction phase (a few years after) (see de Ville de Goyet, 2008 for a 
description of these three phases). It also compares their allocations within the kin group 
and across kin groups, as well as the allocations of food aid on housing and crop damage. 
The paper demonstrates how the targeting gap, elite domination, and targeting bias vary 
over post-disaster phases, at different levels of allocation, and across different shocks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Fijian data 
and kin-based hierarchy. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics of cyclone damage, 
relief, and reconstruction. Section 4 develops a conceptual framework of aid allocation 
through risk sharing, social hierarchy, and their interaction, deriving testable hypotheses 
on the targeting gap, elite domination, and targeting bias. Section 5 develops empirical 
models to test the hypotheses, followed by the results in Section 6. The last section 
summarizes major findings and discusses implications for disaster management. 
2.  DATA, KINSHIP, AND HIERARCHY 




On January 13, 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern regions of 
the Fiji Islands. I conducted two rounds of household surveys in intentionally chosen 
native Fijian villages with distinct environmental and economic conditions in the 
northern region (Ami was the only cyclone from 1991 through 2005).
2 In each village, 
households were stratified by the smallest kin-group unit (defined shortly) and a 
combination of individual leadership (also defined shortly) and major asset holdings (e.g., 
shops) (all kin groups are sampled); in each stratum, households were randomly sampled.  
The first-round interviews conducted between late August and early November 
2003 among 374 households in 9 villages (including 43 clans, defined shortly) cover the 
relief and early recovery phases (henceforth called relief sample; the analysis is based on 
340 households with complete data). The second-round interviews conducted between 
July and September 2005 among 906 households in 43 villages (including 7 villages 
covered in the first round, and 146 clans) cover the recovery/reconstruction phase 
(henceforth called reconstruction sample). Both surveys collected information about 
demographics, assets, production, income, shocks, disaster aid, and private transfers (but 
not consumption).
3 Labor-transfer data were not collected in the first round, and labor 
transfers only in the past one year were collected in the second round. The data lack 
information about specific process of aid allocation.  
(b) Kinship and hierarchy 
Each native Fijian belongs to a lineage of the vanua-yavusa-mataqali-tokatoka 
hierarchy: Vanua consists of several yavusa; yavusa consists of several mataqali; and 
mataqali consists of several tokatoka (Ravuvu, 1983). Although vanua ranges over 




subgroups. Fijians’ social status is clearly defined as follows. First, among mataqali 
(henceforth called clan), one to which a yavusa or mataqali chief (clan chief) belongs 
holds a higher status than others (where there is no takatoka chief). Second, among 
households, one with a clan leader (either a clan chief or non-chief leader, whose status 
is lower than the chief) who plays a major role in the clan’s decision-making and 
negotiations among clans holds a higher status than other households. Village chiefs are 
either a clan chief or non-chief leader. These kin groups and patrimonial status are of 
central importance not only for village governance and ritual, but also for livelihoods 
(Turner, 1992); in particular, land is communally owned by mataqali (about 83% of the 
country’s total land is communal and cannot be sold by law), and customary rights for 
coastal fishing are held by vanua or several yavusa.  
In the relief sample, about 9% of households have a clan leader and about 22% 
belong to clan-chief’s clans (clan chiefs themselves are very uncommon, see Table 1). 
About 14% of households have a clan leader or a leader of tokatoka (henceforth called 
sub-clan) (sub-clan leaders’ status is lower than clan leaders’), and about 42% belong to 
clan- or village-chief’s clans. The distributions of these elites and elite groups in the 
reconstruction sample are similar.  
3.  CYCLONE DAMAGE, RELIEF, AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(a) Cyclone damage 
The total damage across the country caused by Cyclone Ami is estimated at 
F$104 million (F$1 = US$.60), of which dwelling damage is F$22 million and crop 
damage is F$40 million (National Disaster Management Office, 2003). In the sample 




casualties and very limited injuries and illnesses caused directly by the cyclone. 
Household migration after the cyclone was almost nonexistent.  
According to respondents’ subjective assessments, in the relief sample, 8% and 
45% of their main houses were completely destroyed and partially damaged, respectively, 
and the comparable figures in the reconstruction sample are 19% and 34% (Table 1)
4 
(although many, but not all, households also had other free-standing units, such as 
kitchens, showers, and toilets, the paper focuses on damage to the main houses). Almost 
40% of households with housing damaged in the relief sample became refugees who 
stayed in others’ residences in the same village. About two thirds of the refugees lived 
with households in the same clan; hence, the clan served as a risk-sharing group.  
Almost all households engaged in cropping and fishing. In the relief sample, 
cropping accounted for over one half of the total income before the cyclone, followed by 
fishing, with a 30% income share. About 87% of households experienced crop damage, 
and the mean value of damaged crops was F$35 per adult equivalent, which was about 
60% of the mean monthly pre-cyclone crop income.
5  
(b) Relief 
The Red Cross, other nongovernmental organizations, and governments 
provisioned relief, and food aid was the largest form of relief in the region. In the relief 
sample, respondents were asked the quantity of food aid received in each month 
measured in the number of days it would have taken to consume the food in normal 
periods, not the actual duration (foodstuffs in relief were mostly uniform across villages). 
The main delivery started in March; by the end of March, over three fourths of 




three months, recipient households received about 13 days worth of food per month, on 
average, and the mean amount of food aid received in the six-month period among all 
households was about 10 days per month. The value of 60 days ration for six months is 
equivalent to about F$100 per capita, almost three times the average crop damage per 
adult equivalent. As households also collected harvestable damaged crops, food shortage 
was not a major issue. Households individually rehabilitated cropping; they planted fast-
growing crops (e.g., sweet potato) after seeds were provisioned as part of the relief. 
Although the harvest had already started at the time of interviews in 2003, the mean crop 
income was still over 40% lower than the pre-cyclone level; cropping recovered after that 
time. 
(c) Reconstruction 
In the second-round survey, each household was asked whether it had received 
construction materials, and the recipient was asked about the year and month of receipt 
and its monetary value. Provisions in the first year (2003) were very limited; only 5% of 
households were recipients (Table 1).
6 In addition to the co-residence for refugees, people 
helped others’ housing rehabilitation; at the time of interviews in 2003, 38% of houses 
completely destroyed had been rebuilt, 62% of dwellings (including free-standing units) 
had completed repairs, and refugees were uncommon.  
Even after the provision of construction materials augmented in the second year, 
mutual help was crucial; although carpenters were sometimes sent to villages to help 
build new houses, villagers did most of the work. At the time of interviews in 2005, 
recipients reached 25% of households; although almost no households without dwelling 




coverage. Provisions of full construction materials for new house building were delayed 
until the fourth quarter of the second year. The mean amount received among all 
recipients was F$2,680. Among households with housing completely destroyed, 40% had 
rebuilt their houses; 51% of recipients and 20% of non-recipients had done so 
(information about repairing is lacking in the reconstruction sample). Hence, provisions 
of construction materials greatly helped housing rehabilitation, but the supply was far 
short of demand, and the amount received by recipients was insufficient, especially for 
new house building. As a result, self-reconstruction (with mutual help) was relatively 
common.   
4.  RISK SHARING AND HIERARCHY 
(a) Risk sharing 
I assume that households seek to smooth utility determined by consumption, 
leisure, and housing quality against crop damage (income shock) and housing damage 
(preference shock). There is no housing market, and health shock, savings, credits, 
migration, and across-village transfers are ignored. Ex post risk sharing consists of non-
labor sharing – cash and inkind (e.g., food) – to smooth consumption and housing quality 
and labor sharing for housing rehabilitation within the village; crop rehabilitation does 
not involve labor sharing.
7 How well risk sharing can work depends on pooled resources 
that can be shared. On one hand, non-labor resources are greatly reduced by crop damage 
and for smoothing consumption and rehabilitating housing; on the other hand, given that 
labor endowment is largely intact, labor resources do not decrease much, except for labor 
supply for own crop and housing rehabilitation and earning extra income.
8 Thus, the 




sharing can work depends on the distribution of potential recipients (those with housing 
damaged) and donors (those without); the smaller the ratio of the former to the latter, i.e., 
the smaller the degree of covariate shocks, the more effective is the labor sharing (this 
ratio was about one half in Fiji). Overall risk-sharing outcome is measured by net 
aggregate private transfers (labor and non-labor) received by households against their 
shocks.    
I assume that disaster aid, consisting of non-labor resources distributed to the 
village by aid agents, is allocated in the village as part of risk sharing. Disaster aid 
augments non-labor resources, thereby substituting for non-labor transfers (for simplicity, 
perfect substitutability is assumed). Then, overall risk-sharing outcome is determined by 
aggregate private transfers, including aid; in contrast, targeting performance is measured 
by aid responses to household shocks. The greater the gap between these two, i.e., the 
targeting gap, the less useful is targeting performance. If risk-sharing groups are clustered 
in the village so that risk sharing consists of one among households within the group and 
another across groups, the targeting gap across groups is defined on group-level covariate 
shocks.   
What determines the magnitude of the targeting gap? First, on one hand, in the 
relief and early recovery phases, when emergency food aid is the dominant form of aid, 
housing rehabilitation relies on risk sharing; as labor/non-labor transfers for housing 
rehabilitation and non-labor transfers, including food aid for consumption smoothing, 
coexist, the targeting gap can be large. On the other hand, in the recovery/reconstruction 
phase, when consumption smoothing is not a major concern (after crop rehabilitation) 




rehabilitation are major risk-sharing arrangements. In contrast to food aid, which 
substitutes for non-labor transfers, construction materials complement labor transfers, 
because they facilitate rebuilding/repairing; thus, the targeting gap should be small. 
Hypothesis 1-1: The earlier the post-disaster phase, the greater is the targeting gap.  
Next, the stronger the risk sharing, the greater is the potential targeting gap. 
Suppose that risk sharing is stronger within the group than across groups, because of the 
closer connection among group members and a smaller degree of covariate shocks within 
the group than across groups;
9 then,  
Hypothesis 1-2: The targeting gap in the within-group allocation is greater than 
that in the across-group allocation. 
The targeting gap of food aid also depends on whether or not shocks involve labor 
sharing.  
Hypothesis 1-3: The targeting gap on housing damage is greater than that on crop 
damage.  
(b) Hierarchy 
I assume that the allocation of disaster aid in the village is determined by 
bargaining between elites and non-elites, independent of risk sharing. Elite domination 
can take a form of either elite capture or norm-based prioritization without involving 
capturing (henceforth called elite norms). Elite capture has received much attention in 
community-based development (e.g., Bardhan, 2002; Conning and Kevane, 2002; 
Platteau and Abraham, 2002); in kin-based societies with hereditary elite status like Fiji, 
strong elite norms underlie social equilibrium. What distinguishes between elite capture 




status quo, elites compare benefits and costs of capturing disaster aid, where social costs 
can include reputation damage and non-elites’ antipathy. It is possible that elites will 
allocate aid to non-elites (i.e., elite inferiority) if the benefits of doing so (social benefits 
and prioritization in private transfers as a counterpart) outweigh the costs (giving up the 
aid). Some studies show that elites’ capturing program benefits is not necessarily 
pernicious to community development, because elites might take actions that benefit non-
elites (i.e., ‘benevolent capture’, Mansuri and Rao, 2004). On the other hand, according 
to elite norms with elite dominance as the status quo, non-elites compare benefits and 
costs of not conforming to such norms (getting the aid vs. social sanction). 
Differentiating between elite capture and norms requires detailed data on the allocation 
process (which the Fijian data lack).
10 Bargaining between elite and non-elite groups is 
analogous.  
The magnitude of elite dominance in aid allocation is determined by the 
difference in social ranks between elites and non-elites. In both elite capture and norms, 
the larger the rank difference, the smaller is the elites’ costs of capturing and the larger is 
non-elites’ costs of non-conformity to the norms;
11 i.e.,    
Hypothesis 2: The stronger the social hierarchy, the greater is elite dominance. 
In other words, as the rank difference gets smaller, elite dominance becomes weaker; 
with no rank difference, elite dominance vanishes.   
(c) Interaction of risk sharing and hierarchy 
Risk sharing and social hierarchy can interact with each other in the allocation of 
disaster aid in two ways. First, independent of risk sharing, the greater elites’ damage 




elites’ costs of non-conformity to norms (i.e., elites’ relative damage serves like their 
status).  
Hypothesis 3-1: The greater elites’ damage relative to non-elites’, the greater is 
elite dominance.  
A difference in damage by rank can augment or reduce elite domination; it is possible 
that elites of the same status exhibit inferiority and domination in the allocation 
depending on their damage. 
Second, I conjecture that elites are prioritized in overall risk-sharing arrangements, 
i.e., aggregate private transfers, including disaster aid, more strongly respond to elites’ 
damage than non-elites’. Whether this pattern is observed in aid allocation depends on the 
magnitude of the targeting gap.  
Hypothesis 3-2: When the targeting gap is small, aid allocation more strongly 
responds to elites’ damage than non-elites’. 
Then, targeting performance is stronger for elites than non-elites; that is, elite domination 
also exists in targeting on damage, i.e., targeting bias. The pattern in hypothesis 3-1 also 
effectively gives rise to targeting bias. As the targeting gap makes targeting performance 
less useful, targeting bias loses its usefulness as a potential source of systematic targeting 
errors when the targeting gap is large; for example, elite inferiority in aid allocation may 
reflect strong elite domination in other private transfers. Analogous to hypothesis 2, the 
rank difference between elites and non-elites determines the magnitude of targeting bias: 
i.e.,  
Hypothesis 3-3: The stronger the social hierarchy, the greater is the targeting bias. 




I employ three empirical models for food aid (relief model) and housing 
construction materials (reconstruction model). The first model focuses on the allocation 
of disaster aid within clans. I conjecture that aid allocation to household i, yi, is 
determined by within-clan risk sharing against household-level shocks (housing and crop 
damage), Xi, and its social status, Zi. A reduced-form model is: 
i i i i i e G W Z X y        1 1 1 1 G J E D ,             (1)  
where Wi is other household characteristics that determine the allocation (defined below); 
G is clan dummies, which control for clan-level covariate shocks, total aid allocated to 
the clan, and clan’s social status; and ei is an error term.
12 Targeting performance is 
measured by positive ȕ1, and elite domination/inferiority is measured by positive/negative 
Ȗ1. 
Equation (1) can be extended to net aggregate private transfers received 
(including disaster aid and co-residence); let ȕ
*
1 denote the corresponding coefficient for 
Xi. The targeting gap is ȕ
*
1 - ȕ1. For a given level of overall risk sharing ȕ
*
1, the smaller 
the ȕ1, the greater is the targeting gap; ȕ1 can even be negative. The lack of complete 
information about labor transfers in the current data precludes me from estimating ȕ
*
1 and 
thus the targeting gap. My empirical strategy to capture the targeting gap relies on aid 
allocation negatively responding to shocks; negative ȕ1 indicates compensated private 
transfers in other forms, because targeting errors per se do not make ȕ1 negative. If 
estimated ȕ1 is negative for food aid and positive for construction materials, then 
hypothesis 1-1 holds.
13  
The second model captures within- and across-clan allocations in the village: 




where Xg ,Zg, and Wg, respectively, are clan g’s cyclone damage, social status, and other 
characteristics that affect the allocation; and V is village dummies, which control for 
village-level covariate shocks and total aid allocated to the village (as well as village’s 
social status, Takasaki, forthcoming-a). If aid is allocated across households at only the 
village level, clan-level factors are redundant; that is, clans do not serve as a risk-sharing 
group, or aid allocation is part of risk sharing only at the village level. In contrast, the 
significant impacts of both clan- and household-level shocks suggest that not only the 
village but also clans serve as a risk-sharing group, as assumed in equation (1) (Morduch, 
2005; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009), and aid allocation is part of risk sharing at both 
the village and clan levels. In the relief model, negative ȕ1/ȕ2 for housing damage and 
negative ȕ1/positive ȕ2 for crop damage support hypotheses 1-2 and 1-3 (that ȕ1 is greater 
for housing damage than crop damage in magnitude cannot be tested, as shown below). 
Positive/negative Ȗ2 captures elite clans’ domination/inferiority. If the estimation results 
of household variables in equation (2) are similar to those of (1) with clan factors fully 
controlled for, then unobserved clan factors in (2) are unlikely to cause significant bias.  
The third model captures the potential interaction of risk sharing and hierarchy by 
adding interaction terms of cyclone damage and social status to equation (2): 
i g g g g g i i i i i i e V W Z X Z X W Z X Z X y             2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 G K J E G K J E D  (3) 
Targeting bias is captured by positive Ș1/Ș2: Hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2 can be tested by 
examining the marginal effects of social status and cyclone damage, respectively.  
All equations are estimated by OLS. Allocation rules may be distinct between the 
allocations of recipients and amount received among recipients and may change as aid 




model) and the amount received per month (log), conditional on receipt, in the first three 
months (relief phase), and then the amount received per month (log) in six months 
(including the early recovery phase). In the reconstruction model, receipt and the amount 
received, conditional on receipt, are estimated in the first year (early recovery phase), in 
two years (including the recovery/reconstruction phase), and in two years and 9 months 
(up to the interviews in 2005) separately. This hurdle model is commonly used in 
previous works (e.g., Dercon and Krishnan, 2005; Jayne et al., 2002).
14 If negative ȕ1 is 
found only in the first three months, then hypothesis 1-1 is further supported.  
Household damage is captured by a dummy for damaged housing and the value of 
crop damage per adult equivalent (log) in the relief model,
15 and two dummies for 
housing completely destroyed and partially damaged in the reconstruction model. Clan 
damage is measured by the proportion of households with damaged housing in the clan 
and the clan-mean of crop damage per adult equivalent in the relief model, and two 
variables for the proportions of households with complete and partial housing damage in 
the clan in the reconstruction model. Two sets of household and clan status are 
considered: clan leader and clan-chief’s clan vs. clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-
chief’s clan. Recall that the former (the latter’s subset) captures higher ranks than the 
latter. If the estimated positive Ȗ1/Ȗ2 and Ș1/Ș2 of the former are greater than those of the 
latter, then hypotheses 2 and 3-3, respectively, are supported. Other household and clan 
factors are standard ones, such as demographic factors and assets.
16      
6.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 




Estimation results of cyclone damage and social status in the relief and 
reconstruction models are reported in Tables 2 and 3. In each table, panels A and B, 
respectively, show results for models with clan leader and clan-chief’s clan and models 
with clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-chief’s clan (results of cyclone damage not 
shown in panel B are very similar to those in panel A); in each panel, results of equations 
(1) and (2) are organized by period of interest and then receipt/amount (robust standard 
errors are reported and clustered by clan in models with village dummies).
17  
Estimation results of household variables in equation (2) are almost the same as 
those in (1). In the first three months, food-aid recipients are more common among 
households without damaged housing that offered help for refugees and housing 
rehabilitation than among others that received such help (qualitatively the same 
comparison holds in the descriptive statistics, Takasaki, 2011d). Among recipients, a 
greater amount is allocated to clans with larger crop damage and then households with 
smaller crop damage, which could contribute more to labor sharing because of their 
smaller crop rehabilitation. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 1-2; as private 
risk sharing, especially labor sharing within the clan, against housing damage was 
prioritized, a large targeting gap emerged. Consistent with hypothesis 1-3, the allocation 
in six months is negatively associated with clan-level housing damage only. It is neutral 
to all other shocks; thus, the allocation rule in the relief phase was reversed later, 
supporting hypothesis 1-1.   
In contrast, the allocation of construction materials – both receipt and amount 
received – strongly responded to household damage over time. Thus, combined with the 




(especially large ones) augment, targeting performance improves: The probability of 
receipt by households with housing completely destroyed increased from .20 in the first 
year to .41 in two years and then .63; the probability of receipt by those with partial 
damage increased from .17 to .31 in two years and then was stable. The allocation is 
neutral to clan-level shocks; the only exception is that clans with greater damage – both 
complete and partial damage – receive larger amount in two years. It thus appears that 
clans play a limited role in the late post-disaster phase (I return to this below).   
Social status does not strongly alter the allocation of food aid; although clan 
leaders are less likely to be recipients in the first three months, this pattern loses 
statistically significance in equation (3) (according to the joint significant test, as shown 
below). In contrast, the social status of households, but not clans, positively affects the 
allocation of construction materials: Clan leaders dominate receipt in two years and in 
two years and nine months (20% and 14% marginal effects, respectively, in the models 
with clan dummies) and amount received in two years (54% marginal effect); clan/sub-
clan leaders do not significantly affect receipt in two years and nine months. That clan 
leaders’ domination persists longer than sub-clan leaders’ supports hypothesis 2. As such, 
it appears that elite domination at the clan level is nonexistent over the post-disaster 
phases (I return to this shortly).   
(b) Interaction of risk sharing and hierarchy 
Estimation results of equation (3) are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Although 
considering four interaction terms of cyclone damage and social status – two at the 
household level and another two at the clan level – is possible, I can include only those of 




clan status with housing damage (complete and partial damage) in the reconstruction 
model; variations in those of housing damage and household status, respectively, are too 
limited. In the reconstruction model, no amount equation with interaction terms is 
estimated, because of limited variations among recipients. 
I first focus on models with clan leader and clan-chief’s clan (panel A). In the 
allocation of the amount of food aid received, chief’s clans with small and large crop 
damage show elite inferiority and domination, respectively, in both three months and in 
six months (positive Ș2) (the joint significance test for clan status is statistically 
significant in three months and the result in six months is statistically weaker); clan 
leaders are nonsignificant (this is also true when equation 1 is extended by adding the 
household-level interaction term). In the reconstruction model, receipt in the first year is 
dominated by clan-chief’s clans with more housing damage (positive Ș2 for complete 
destruction) (the joint significance test for clan status is statistically significant). These 
results support hypothesis 3-1.  
In the allocation of the amount of food aid received in response to clan-level crop 
damage in three months, the response of clan-chief’s clans is over four times more than 
that of other clans (the joint significance test for clan-level damage is statistically 
significant at a .1% significance level). The allocation of receipt of construction materials 
in the first year responds to completely destroyed houses in clan-chief’s clans only (the 
joint significance test for clans’ housing complete damage is statistically significant). 
These results are consistent with hypothesis 3-2 (recall that the targeting gap is small in 
these allocations). Clan-chief’s clans are more likely to receive construction materials in 




common (I return to this shortly). Note that although clan status with no interaction and 
clan status interacted with complete housing damage are nonsignificant according to the t 
test, their estimated coefficients are large and jointly significant at least at a 1% 
significance level. Hence, distinct from the earlier findings on equation (2), in both relief 
and reconstruction models, clan-chief’s clans with large damage are always prioritized; 
that is, a strong targeting bias exists in the across-clan allocation.    
Estimation results on clan-level partial housing damage in the reconstruction 
model (negative Ș2 for partial damage) are opposite to hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2. First, in 
the allocation of receipt in two years and in two years and nine months, clan-chief’s clans 
with more partial damage exhibit elite inferiority. Second, the allocation of receipt in two 
years and nine months negatively and positively responds to clan-chief’s clans’ and other 
clans’ partial damage, respectively. These patterns coincide with clan leaders’ dominance 
from the second year, when the provision of construction materials augmented. It seems 
that although households with partial damage were relatively prioritized in the clan in the 
first year, from the second year, those with complete damage became the dominant 
priority at the cost of those with partial damage, while maintaining clan leaders’ priority.  
Estimation results for models with clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-chief’s 
clan (panel B) are much weaker, and almost all joint significance tests (corresponding to 
those shown in panel A) are nonsignificant (results not shown; as the only exception, 
clan-level crop damage on the amount of food aid received in three months is statistically 
significant at a 10% significance level). Hence, hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2 more strongly 
hold for households and/or clans with higher elite status in both relief and reconstruction 




partial housing damage in panel B buttress the importance of clans’ high rank underlying 
the potential interaction effects discussed above.       
7.  CONCLUSION 
This paper examined risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies as self-
allocation mechanisms of disaster aid within poor villages. The paper highlighted a 
targeting gap, a difference between targeting performance and overall risk sharing, which 
makes standard targeting less useful. First, the earlier the post-disaster phase, the greater 
is the targeting gap, because private risk sharing significantly makes up limited aid. 
Second, the targeting gap within kin groups, a major risk-sharing group, is greater than 
the targeting gap in the across-group allocation. Third, the targeting gap of food aid on 
housing damage, against which risk-sharing’s making-up plays a role, is greater than that 
on crop damage. Bargaining on aid allocation between elites and non-elites can lead to 
elite domination, through elite capture or norms, which are difficult to distinguish. Risk 
sharing and social hierarchy can interact with each other, leading to elite domination in 
targeting, i.e., targeting bias. The stronger the social hierarchy, the greater is the elite 
dominance and the targeting bias.  
Using original post-cyclone survey data in rural Fiji, the paper showed supporting 
evidence for these hypothesized relationships. First, households with damaged housing 
and greater crop damage are allocated less food aid in the early phase, because they 
receive greater net private transfers in other forms, especially in labor sharing for housing 
rehabilitation; this form of targeting gap is especially strong within kin groups and on 
housing damage. In contrast, the allocation of housing construction materials in the late 




ones, dominate the allocation of construction materials. Third, there exists a targeting 
bias toward highly ranked kin groups in both food aid and construction materials. 
These results lead to the following implications for disaster management:  
1)  Risk-sharing institutions can serve as village self-allocation mechanisms of 
disaster aid. Maintaining and strengthening local safety nets is an effective policy, 
which is consistent and can be linked with broad community-based development 
(Mansuri and Rao, 2004; World Bank, 2002).  
2)  Targeting errors are only a partial problem. In the relief phase with a large 
targeting gap, overall risk sharing needs to receive direct attention; however, 
information about it is lacking the most at that time. Thus, strengthening existing 
local institutions ex ante is critically important.  
3)  In hierarchical societies, elite domination in aid allocation and targeting can be 
strong in any post-disaster phase. As risk-sharing institutions can be strongly built 
on traditional local hierarchies, policies neutralizing elite capture may weaken 
local safety nets; such intervention is questionable for norm-based domination. 
Policymakers need to tackle a challenging tradeoff between the efficiency of 
overall risk sharing and the equity of aid allocation.  
Overall, for better allocation of disaster aid within villages, policymakers and researchers 
need to pay attention to targeting gaps (risk-sharing link), elite domination (hierarchy), 
and targeting bias (hierarchical risk sharing).    
Notes 
1 Obtaining a better understanding of the allocation of disaster aid is critically important 






islanders’ indigenous mechanisms in coping with cyclones because of their increasing 
dependency on emergency aid (e.g., Campbell, 1984).  
2 Almost all villages are located on Vanua Levu and Taveuni Islands, the second- and 
third-largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti 
Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses are 
situated. The study does not cover Indo-Fijians.  
3 Like other post-disaster surveys, information about cyclone damage and aid allocation 
was collected retrospectively. Takasaki (2011d, forthcoming-a) demonstrates that 
systematic measurement errors are unlikely to be a major concern. 
4 Relief officers used the same damage categories for their assessments, and thus the 
damage status of each house was common knowledge among villagers.  
5 Crop damage was calculated based on the quantity damaged for each major crop, as 
reported by respondents. Households employ traditional cropping practices (using no 
mechanized equipment or animal traction and limited purchased inputs) to produce 
mainly taro, cassava, coconut, and kava.   
6 In the relief sample, 16% of households received tarpaulins that could be used as 
emergency shelters and for temporary repair (Takasaki, 2011d analyses their allocation). 
7 Takasaki (2011d) offers the following evidence for labor sharing against housing 
damage. First, households with damaged housing and larger crop damage contribute less 
labor for village rehabilitation. Second, crop income (at the time of interviews in 2003) is 
neutral to crop damage as a result of own crop rehabilitation being intensified in 






less to labor sharing and receive smaller net labor/non-labor transfers, being less likely to 
complete housing rehabilitation. Takasaki (forthcoming-b) addresses the disaster-gender 
nexus, showing that female-headed households are disadvantaged because of a newly 
emerging gendered division of labor for housing rehabilitation.       
8 Takasaki (2011a) finds that households augmented fishing and handicraft selling in 
response to crop damage. 
9 The decomposition of the variance of housing and crop damage indicates that most 
variance exists at the household level, followed by clan-level variance (Takasaki, 2011a). 
In addition to co-residence for refugees, the importance of clans as a risk-sharing group is 
evident from the following: 1) Households without housing damage helped with the 
housing rehabilitation of other clan members by intensifying fishing (Takasaki, 2011a); 
2) Clan members formed major household transfer networks (Takasaki, 2011b); 3) Risk 
sharing against illness (through non-labor transfers) was arranged mainly among clan 
members in 2005 (Takasaki, 2011c).  
10 Noncompliance to elite norms is unlikely in the study area (there is no anecdotal 
evidence for that); then, elite inferiority, if any, is based on elites’ decisions. 
11 It is possible that the higher elites’ status relative to non-elites’, the smaller are elites’ 
benefits of capturing and the greater are non-elites’ benefits of non-conforming, because 
social status can be positively correlated with household asset holdings, which determine 
the household’s self-coping capacity. If the elasticity to the rank difference of elites’ costs 
of capturing and non-elites’ costs of non-conforming is greater than that of their 






12 Whether households rebuild/repair their housing without receiving construction 
materials certainly affects the allocation, but this endogenous decision does not appear as 
an explanatory variable in the reduced-form equation (1). 
13 Although crop damage is less observable than housing damage, the observability 
problem may not be so significant among clan members who own land communally.  
14 An alternative sample-selection model is infeasible with the current data, which lack 
the identifying instruments required to credibly estimate the selection equation. 
Estimating the relief model in the second three months and the reconstruction model in 
the second and third year could be considered, but this would require using the receipt or 
the amount received in previous period(s) as a lagged dependent variable, the 
endogeneity of which cannot be controlled for with these data. 
15 Differentiating between complete and partial damage is infeasible, because the former 
is relatively uncommon (cf. reconstruction sample). Adding an interaction term between 
housing and crop damage does not alter the results reported below (Takasaki, 2011d).  
16 In the relief model, other household factors include: income per adult equivalent per 
month (log), land holdings (log), fishing capital (log), a dummy for secondary education 
among any adults, household adult equivalent size (log), proportions of children and 
elderly, age of household head (log), and a dummy for female head. All are measured 
before the cyclone. Although post-disaster income is affected by disaster aid and private 
transfers, as well as crop damage and rehabilitation, pre-disaster income is not. It is still 
possible that unobserved factors determining income, such as ability, affect aid allocation 






models excluding income, land, and fishing capital, finding almost the same results for 
the remaining variables. Other clan factors consist of the share of households belonging 
to the same clan in the village (in the population), the clan-mean of income, land, and 
capital. Clan size can affect bargaining power; as elite clans tend to be large, controlling 
for clan size is crucial to identify the effects of clan status. In the reconstruction model, 
all household factors in the relief model except for income, land, and capital, measured at 
the time of interviews, are used as controls. Clan factors are clan size and clan-mean land. 
As almost no households newly emerged or vanished after the cyclone, these measures 
largely capture pre-cyclone characteristics. The appendix reports the descriptive statistics 
of these controls; their estimation results are mostly the same as those in Takasaki (2011d, 
forthcoming-a).        
17 The relief equation (1) focuses on clans including both recipients and non-recipients; 
otherwise, clan dummies perfectly predict the allocation of receipt. Similarly, equations 
(2) and (3) can be applied to villages with such variations (villages with only one clan are 
excluded). The numbers of observations for the amount equation conditional on receipt 
further decline. In the reconstruction sample for receipt in the first year, 16% of 
households are recipients (cf. 5% in the whole sample); the corresponding amount 
equation is not estimated because of the small number of recipients. Probit estimates for 
receipt in both relief and reconstruction models are very similar to the OLS results. 
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Clan chief (0/1) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.16)
Clan leader (0/1) 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31)
Clan/sub-clan leader (0/1) 0.14 (0.34) 0.19 (0.40)
Clan chiefs' clan (0/1) 0.22 (0.42) 0.27 (0.44)
Clan-/village-chiefs' clan (0/1) 0.42 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50)
Cyclone damage:
Housing damaged (0/1) 0.53 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Housing completely damaged (0/1) 0.08 (0.27) 0.19 (0.39)
Housing partially damaged (0/1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.34 (0.47)
Crop damaged (0/1) 0.87 (0.33)
Crop damage per adult equivalent (F$) 35.1 (46.1)
Food aid:
Receipt (0/1)
In 3 months 0.77 (0.42)
In 6 months 0.95 (0.21)
Amount per month (days)
For 3 months (recipients only) 12.9 (7.9)
For 6 months (whole sample) 9.8 (6.5)
Construction materials:
Receipt (0/1)
In 1 year 0.05 (0.21)
In 2 years 0.19 (0.39)
In 2 years and 9 months 0.25 (0.43)
Amount received (recipients only) (F$)
In 1 year 2159 (2888)
In 2 years 2137 (2868)
In 2 years and 9 months 2680 (3032)
Rehabilitations:
Crop income per adult equivalent per month (F$)
Before the cyclone 60.9 (90.0)
At the time of interviews 34.7 (59.0) 152.2 (325.9)
0.38 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49)
Recipients of construction materials 0.51 (0.50)
Non-recipients of construction materials 0.20 (0.41)
0.62 (0.49)
No. observations 340 906
Note - Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
Complete dwelling repair (households with 
housing damaged only) (0/1)
New house building at the time of interviews 
(households with housing completely damaged 
only) (0/1)
Table 1. Means of social status, cyclone damage, food aid, housing 







Table 2. Allocation of emergency food aid - OLS with no interaction term.
Period after the cyclone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Models with clan leader and clan-chief's clan.
Cyclone damage:
-0.127 ** -0.122 ** 0.055 0.055 -0.128 -0.133
(0.053) (0.057) (0.068) (0.081) (0.087) (0.083)
-0.023 -0.023 -0.085 *** -0.084 *** -0.019 -0.023
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031)
-0.096 -0.219 -0.459 **
(0.112) (0.143) (0.222)
0.027 0.254 *** 0.039
(0.053) (0.085) (0.141)
Social status:
-0.185 * -0.213 * 0.138 0.100 -0.180 -0.170
(0.111) (0.117) (0.176) (0.188) (0.150) (0.176)
0.010 -0.155 0.083
(0.068) (0.116) (0.125)
Clan dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
0.163 0.118 0.480 0.448 0.237 0.158
325 327 249 252 325 327
B. Models with clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-chief's clan.
Social status:
-0.103 -0.128 0.060 0.067 -0.091 -0.140
(0.082) (0.085) (0.109) (0.124) (0.115) (0.152)






*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; 
those in columns (2), (4), and (6) are clustered by clan. Other controls not shown here are pre-cyclone 
income per adult equivalent per month (log), land holdings (log), fishing capital (log), a dummy for secondary 
education among any adults, household adult equivalent size (log), proportions of children and elderly, age of 
household head (log), a dummy for female head , and constant. Proportion of households belonging to the 
same clan in the village, and clan-means of pre-cyclone income per adult equivalent per month, land 
holdings, and fishing capital are also included in columns (2), (4), and (6). Cyclone damage variables are also 
included in panel B. 
Log of crop damage per adult 
equivalent (F$)
Proportion of housing damaged 
in the clan
Clan-mean of log of crop 
damage per adult equivalent (F$)
Clan leader (0/1)
Clan-chief's clan (0/1)
3 months 6 months
Receipt
Log amount per 
month among 
recipients (days)
Log amount per 
month (days)




Table 3. Allocation of housing construction materials - OLS with no interaction term.
Period after the cyclone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A. Models with clan leader and clan-chief's clan.
Cyclone damage:
0.202 *** 0.166 ** 0.411 *** 0.360 *** 2.655 *** 2.150 *** 0.628 *** 0.577 *** 2.734 *** 2.416 ***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.053) (0.066) (0.297) (0.511) (0.048) (0.053) (0.233) (0.356)
0.166 *** 0.081 ** 0.314 *** 0.228 *** 0.611 ** 0.529 0.312 *** 0.227 *** 0.758 *** 0.757 **
(0.056) (0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.295) (0.393) (0.041) (0.048) (0.236) (0.351)
-0.035 0.079 2.070 ** 0.034 -0.133
(0.111) (0.137) (0.963) (0.113) (0.643)
0.062 -0.024 2.321 ** 0.094 -0.283
(0.070) (0.096) (0.911) (0.082) (0.693)
Social status:
0.028 0.037 0.203 *** 0.131 ** 0.540 * 0.977 ** 0.137 ** 0.109 ** 0.375 0.512
(0.093) (0.049) (0.073) (0.052) (0.278) (0.394) (0.063) (0.051) (0.301) (0.418)
0.040 0.022 0.164 0.045 0.371
(0.035) (0.046) (0.664) (0.033) (0.514)
Clan dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Village dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
0.127 0.093 0.277 0.255 0.685 0.661 0.387 0.376 0.671 0.617
262 404 546 568 129 95 615 652 173 137
B. Models with clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-chief's clan.
Social status:
-0.007 0.013 0.143 ** 0.128 *** 0.615 ** 0.890 ** 0.054 0.070 0.410 0.290
(0.078) (0.041) (0.059) (0.041) (0.294) (0.379) (0.051) (0.044) (0.308) (0.364)
-0.022 -0.035 -0.398 -0.013 0.214





*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; those in columns (2), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), and (10) 
are clustered by clan. Other controls not shown here are a dummy for secondary education among any adults, household adult equivalent size (log), proportions 
of children and elderly, age of household head (log), a dummy for female head, and constant. Proportion of households belonging to the same clan in the village 
and clan-mean of land holdings are also inlcuded in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10). Cyclone damage variables are also included in panel B. 
Housing completely destroyed 
(0/1)
Housing partially damaged (0/1)
Proportion of housing completely 
destroyed in the clan
Proportion of housing partially 
damaged in the clan
Clan leader (0/1)
Clan-chief's clan (0/1)
1 year 2 years 2 years and 9 months
Receipt Receipt
Log amount among 
recipients (F$)




   
Table 4. Allocation of emergency food aid - OLS with interaction terms.
Period after the cyclone
(1) (2) (3)
A. Models with clan leader and clan-chief's clan.
Cyclone damage:
-0.121 ** 0.055 -0.133
(0.056) (0.083) (0.084)
-0.020 -0.086 *** -0.024
(0.014) (0.030) (0.031)
-0.089 -0.100 -0.412 *
(0.111) (0.167) (0.238)










0.143 0.733 *** 0.580 *
(0.165) (0.222) (0.312)
F tests (p-value)
for log of crop damage per adult equivalent 0.332 0.018 0.723
for clan leader 0.149 0.572 0.594
for clan-mean of log of crop damage per adult equivalent 0.589 0.000 0.183
for clan-chief's clan 0.687 0.002 0.115
0.121 0.455 0.161
327 252 327











Log of crop damage per adult equivalent × Clan/sub-clan 
leader
Clan-mean of log of crop damage per adult equivalent × 
Clan-/village-chief's clan (0/1)
*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
clan. Other controls not shown here are pre-cyclone income per adult equivalent per month (log), land 
holdings (log), fishing capital (log), a dummy for secondary education among any adults, household adult 
equivalent size (log), proportions of children and elderly, age of household head (log), a dummy for female 
head, proportion of households belonging to the same clan in the village, and clan-means of pre-cyclone 
income per adult equivalent per month, land holdings, and fishing capital, village dummies, and constant.  
Cyclone damage variables are also included in panel B. 






Log of crop damage per adult equivalent (F$)
Proportion of housing damaged in the clan
Clan-mean of log of crop damage per adult equivalent (F$)
Clan leader (0/1)
Clan-chief's clan (0/1)
Log of crop damage per adult equivalent × Clan leader














   
Table 5. Receipt of housing construction materials - OLS with interaction terms.
Period after the cyclone
(1) (2) (3)
A. Models with clan leader and clan-chief's clan.
Cyclone damage:
0.165 ** 0.360 *** 0.577 ***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.053)




0.060 0.063 0.177 **
(0.071) (0.087) (0.077)
Social status:





0.623 *** 0.341 0.375
(0.218) (0.308) (0.258)
0.137 -0.539 *** -0.450 ***
(0.148) (0.196) (0.170)
F tests (p-value)
for proportion of housing completely destroyed in the clan 0.021 0.402 0.334
for proportion of housing partially damaged in the clan 0.458 0.026 0.010
for clan-chief's clan 0.025 0.001 0.000
for clan-chief's clan (interacted with proportion of housing 
completely destroyed in the clan only) 0.012 0.003 0.000
for clan-chief's clan (interacted with proportion of housing 
partially damaged in the clan only) 0.186 0.004 0.009
0.100 0.263 0.383
404 568 652
B. Models with clan/sub-clan leader and clan-/village-chief's clan.
Social status:









*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by clan. Other controls not shown here are a dummy for secondary education among any adults, 
household adult equivalent size (log), proportions of children and elderly, age of household head (log), a 
dummy for female head, proportion of households belonging to the same clan in the village, clan-mean of 





Proportion of housing completely destroyed in the clan × 
Clan-/village-chief's clan
Proportion of housing partially damaged in the clan × Clan-
/village-chief's clan
Proportion of housing partially damaged in the clan
Clan leader (0/1)
Clan-chief's clan (0/1)
Proportion of housing completely destroyed in the clan × 
Clan-chief's clan (0/1)
Proportion of housing partially damaged in the clan × Clan-
chief's clan (0/1)
1 year 2 years
2 years and 
9 months
Housing completely destroyed (0/1)
Housing partially damaged (0/1)





Earned income per adult equivalent per month (F$) 114.1 (116.3) 227.3 (316.4)
Land holdings (acre) 4.94 (6.04) 2.83 (4.82)
Fishing capital (F$) 484 (1505) 313 (2139)
Adults' secondary education (0/1) 0.84 (0.37) 0.81 (0.40)
Household size (adult equivalent) 4.95 (2.25) 4.36 (2.15)
Proportion of children (<15) 0.32 (0.21) 0.28 (0.22)
Proportion of elderly (>65) 0.06 (0.14) 0.09 (0.21)
Age of household head 48.4 (13.7) 51.4 (14.6)
Female head (0/1) 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29)
Clan's household share in the village 0.38 (0.21) 0.42 (0.29)
No. observations 340 906




Note - Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. These characteristics are 
measured before the cyclone in the relief sample and at the time of interviews in the 
reconstruction sample.